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COMMENTS 
CONFLICTS OF LAW-EXTENDED APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA 
IN AnMINSTRATION OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES-Too often traditional 
rules of law are blindly followed without adequate re-evaluation 
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of their usefulness in terms of new trends and policies. One such 
neglected rule is the traditional refusal to apply res judicata prin-
ciples in actions involving administrators or executors in different 
states where a decedent's estate is sued by a creditor of the decedent, 
or where the estate is suing a debtor of the decedent. This problem 
arises from the fact that the fundamental structure of administra-
tion of decedents' estates in the United States is founded on the 
principle of a separate administration within each jurisdiction 
where assets of the decedent are located. As a result there is often 
an excessive duplication of litigation which over-burdens our 
already crowded court dockets. Possibly this condition could be 
alleviated by more extensive application of the doctrine of res 
judicata in these cases. The purpose of this comment is to examine 
the existing law and its rationale, and to see in which situations 
res judicata could beneficially be applied. 
I. Existing Law and Rationale When Creditor Attempts To Bind 
Local Estate With Foreign Judgment 
For over a century it has been a generally recognized rule of 
law that judgments against a decedent's administrator in state A 
are not conclusive or binding on decedent's administrator or exe-
cutor in state B.1 The leading case of Stacy v. Thrasher2 held that 
a creditor's judgment against an ancillary administrator was not 
conclusive in a second suit by the creditor against the domiciliary 
administrator. The same result is reached if the domiciliary ad-
ministrator is sued first.3 Even if the same party is defending 
administrator in both jurisdictions, res judicata would not be 
applied.4 However, a distinction is made in the case of executors. 
If the same party is executor in both jurisdictions, a judgment in 
state A is binding on him in state B.5 But if there are two different 
executors, a judgment in the first suit may be used only as evidence 
in the second.6 While decisions go both ways7 in the hybrid situa-
tion of an executor and an administrator cum testamento annexo, 
1 CoNFLICTS REsrATEMENT §§506 (1), 510 (1) (1934); STUMBERG, CONFLICTS OF LAW 443-
446 (1951); GOODRICH, CONFLICTS OF LAW, 3d ed., §191 (1949). 
2 6 How. (47 U.S.) 44 (1848). 
3 McCleen v. Meek, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 16 (1855). 
4 Nash v. Benari, 117 Me. 491, 105 A. 107 (1918); Johnston v. McKinnon, 129 Ala. 
223, 29 S. 696 (1901). Contra, Creighton v. Murphy, 8 Neb. 349, 1 N.W. 138 (1879). 
5 Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891); Owsley v. Central Trust Co. of N.Y., (S.D. 
N.Y. 1912) 196 F. 412. 
6 Hill v. Tucker, 13 How. (54 U.S.) 458 (1851). The court permitted the judgment 
to be used as evidence in order to preclude the ancillary executor from pleading the 
statute of limitations as a defense. 
7 Judgment conclusive: Garland v. Garland, 84 Va. 181, 4 S.E. 334 (1887); Latine v. 
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the majority have denied both res judicata and evidentiary effect. 
Furthermore, it makes no difference that the action was com-
menced against the decedent during his lifetime and later revived 
against his representative.8 The above rules were developed where 
the issue most frequently arises, that is, where a creditor attempts 
to use a judgment obtained against the estate in state A to bind 
the representative in state B, and an analysis of the rationale of 
the law as it applies to this one situation should precede a discussion 
of the applicability of the same principles to other situations in 
multi-state administration. 
A. In Rem or In Personam? The separate administration of 
decedents' estates is justified by the power of each sovereign state 
to regulate the manner and circumstances under which property 
within its territory shall be transferred.0 This necessitates the 
appointment of an administrator in each jurisdiction where assets 
are found, since the authority and power of an administrator or 
executor under his letters testamentary extend only to the territory 
of the issuing state.10 Because of this territorial limitation on 
authority, the administration is sometimes considered a proceeding 
in rem11 or quasi-in-rem12 as to the assets in the jurisdiction. Thus 
any adjudication on the assets within one jurisdiction would not 
be conclusive on assets within another. However, if the proceeding 
is considered as an in personam action against the representative 
of the estate, whether or not the representative in the second suit 
is a party or privy to the first suit becomes the controlling issue. 
B. Privity. Probably the reason most often given for denying 
res judicata between administrators is that no privity exists be-
tween administrators and executors authorized under laws of differ-
Clements, 3 Kelly (Ga.) 426 (1847). Judgment not conclusive: Ela v. Edwards, 13 Allen 
(95 Mass.) 48 (1866); Richards v. Blaisdell, 12 Cal. App. 101, 106 P. 732 (1909). 
s Brown v. Fletcher's Estate, 146 Mich. 401, 109 N.W. 686 (1906). Contra, Creighton v. 
Murphy, 8 Neb. 349, 1 N.W. 138 (1879). 
o See 1 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §157 (1923). Divided ad-
ministrations are also justified on the basis that it permits local creditors to be satisfied 
first out of local assets, enabling them to avoid the inconvenience of filing claiins outstate. 
See Buchanan and Myers, "The Administration of Intangibles in View of First National 
Bank v. Maine," 48 HARV. L. REv. 911 (1935), wherein the authors also trace the historical 
development of the administration of decedents' estates. 
10 See 1 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §158 (1923). 
11 See Simes, "The Administration of Decedent Estates as Proceeding in Rem," 43 
MICH. L. REv. 675 (1944). For administration on an entity theory, see Bayse, "Dispensing 
With Administration,'' 44 MICH. L. REv. 329 (1945). See also STUMBERC, CONFLICTS OF 
LAw, 2d ed., 439, n. 6 (1951). Cf. Baker, "In the Administration of Intangibles: Missouri's 
Section 466.010 in Perspective," 19 Mo. L. REv. 1 at 13-19, 36-42 (1954). 
12 Johnson v. Powers, 139 U.S. 156 (1891). See 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws 1552 
(1935). 
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ent jurisdictions.13 The requirement of privity arises from the 
general rule that a judgment in personam is only binding on parties 
or privies.14 It is well recognized that administrators and executors 
are each in privity with the decedent and that a judgment against 
the decedent during his lifetime is binding on his representatives.11s 
Consequently, it has been contended that since the representatives 
are all in privity with the decedent, the source of their interests, 
they should also be in privity with each other.16 This conclusion 
is fallacious, however, if one adopts the classical definition of priv-
ity, viz., a "mutual or successive relationship to the same right of 
property."17 It is clear that the representatives in different juris-
dictions do not succeed to, nor have a mutual relation to, the same 
property rights, but succeed only to. those assets within their re-
spective jurisdictions.18 Furthermore, even an administrator ap-
pointed in both states A and B is not considered to have been a 
party to an adjudication in state A when he is being sued in state 
B since he is sued in a different capacity in the second suit.19 In 
any case, it is doubtful that the lack of technical privity is the true 
reason for a denial of res judicata, since, as one court put it, a find-
ing of privity is just a legal conclusion raised in order to justify 
the binding effect of a judgment in a particular case.20 The real 
basis for refusing to apply res judicata in these cases is the question-
able but accepted policy of separate administrations and the courts' 
interest in prevention of fraud. 
C. Prevention of Fraud. The judges in the early opinions on 
the question of res judicata between administrators realized that 
the rules were based on mere technicalities causing much incon-
venience, 21 but sustained the results because they were afraid that 
a judgment procured by fraud or collusion in state A would be 
conclusively binding in state B. It was stated in the first leading 
opinion, Brodie v. Bickley:~2 
13 Stacy v. Thrasher, 6 How. (47 U.S.) 44 (1848). See Story, CONFLICT OF LAws, 8th 
ed., §522 (1883). 
14 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, 5th ed., §407 (1925). 
15 Id., §492. . 
16 See La tine v. Clements, 3 Kelly (Ga.) 426 (1847). Contra, Low v. Bartlett, 8 Allen 
(90 Mass.) 259 (1864). 
171 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE, 15th ed., §523 (1892). , 
18 Wilson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., (8th Cir. 1908) 164 F. 817. 
19 See Nash v. Benari, 117 Me. 491, 105 A. 107 (1918). 
20 Taylor v. Sartorious, 130 Mo. App. 23, 108 S.W. 1089 (1908). See Developments in 
the Law of Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818 at 855 (1952). 
21 Stacy v. Thrasher, 6 How. (47 U.S.) 44 (1848); Ingersoll v. Coram, 211 U.S. 335 
(1908). 
22 2 Rawle (Pa.) 431 (1830). The facts of this case gave adequate cause for the court's 
fear of possible collusion, since the foreign .administrator in Barbados had confessed 
judgment. 
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"It is of little moment that such a [fraudulent] judgment 
is not conclusive and that if there be fraud in fact, the adminis-
trator here may show it. It is sufficient that the doctrine [ res 
judicata] would shift the burden of proof in the first instance 
and send the defendant [administrator] abroad under every 
possible disadvantage, to investigate transactions, the secret 
springs of which must necessarily be hidden from him."23 
This aversion to placing the burden of proof of fraud on the local 
administrator was reiterated as a ba~is for the opinion of the 
Supreme Court in Stacy v. Thrasher, where the Court felt the shift 
"would cause much greater inconvenience and injury than any 
that can possibly result from the present decision."24 
Exactly how much fraud or collusion would occur if foreign 
judgments were binding is difficult to estimate. A real danger may 
exist, however, if a creditor has an ancillary administrator ap-
pointed25 in state A in order that the creditor may file his claim 
against the decedent's assets in that state. It is quite possible that 
the administrator appointed will be friendly to the creditor, and, 
because of collusion, the administrator may not properly contest 
a disputable claim. If such a judgment26 were conclusive else-
where, there would be a real danger of prejudice to other creditors 
and devisees. Furthermore, it is possible the fraud involved may 
be considered intrinsic fraud, and the judgment may not be subject 
therefore to collateral attack.27 Under present law no distinction 
is made as to whether the first suit arose in a domiciliary or ancil-
lary admipistration. It might be argued that the judgment should 
be binding if the suit arose in the domiciliary state, for usually a 
relative is appointed there, and the likelihood of fraud would be 
minimal since he would have the best interests of the estate in 
mind.28 If the same party is administrator in both states, the 
questio1,1 of fraud will never even be raised. 
23 Id. at 437-438. 
24 6 How. (47 U.S.) 44 at 61 (1848). For interesting variations in suits involving 
decedent's fraudulent transfers see White v. Croker, (5th Cir. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 321; King 
v. Clarke, 2 Hill Eq. (S.C.) 6ll (1836). 
25 In some states the creditor himself can be appointed the administrator. See 2 
WOERNER, AMERICAN I.Aw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §239 (1923). 
20 Whether a claim allowed or disallowed by a probate court will be considered a 
judgment for purposes of full faith and credit may depend on individual state procedure 
and whether the claim was contested on the merits. See, e.g., Taylor v. Barron, 35 N.H. 
484 (1857); Goodall v. Marshall, 14 N.H. 161 (1843). 
27 See "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud and Relief Against Judgments," 4 VAND. L. REv. 
338 (1951). 
28 But see Strauss v. Philips, 189 Ill. 9, 59 N.E. 560 (1901), where decedent's wife, the 
domiciliary administrator, did attempt to defraud the estate to the prejudice of other 
creditors. 
266 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
Aside from the issue of fraud, would the application of res 
judicata in any other way prejudice creditors? If the decedent's 
estate is totally insolvent, the foreign judgment creditor would 
receive only his proportionate share of the total estate, for the 
estate would be treated as an entity in this situation.29 On the 
other hand, if the estate on the whole is solvent, and the judgment 
creditor is satisfied before local creditors,30 local creditors would 
be prejudiced only to the extent that they had to file claims else-
where to be fully satisfied.31 
D. Distinction Between Administrators and Executors. That 
there should be res judicata effect on judgments where the same 
party is executor in both states32 while not where the same party38 
is administrator has been criticized by most leading commenta-
tors.34 The differentiation first arose in Hill v. Tucker,35 where 
the Supreme Court distinguished the executor from the adminis-
trator on the basis that executors derive their authority from the 
will rather than from the state; and that as to creditors, executors 
are all in privity since they owe the same responsibility to creditors 
no matter where the assets exist36 or where the executor is qualified. 
The Court's reasoning is no longer valid. Though the will may 
direct the choice of who shall be the executor and possibly delimit 
his powers, yet only by complying with conditions set forth in 
state statutes is the executor able to effectuate the administration.87 
Actually, both the executor and the administrator receive their 
power and authority from the state. Furthermore, in Hill v. 
Tucker, the court reasoned that because co-executors within the 
29 Estate of Hanreddy, 176 Wis. 570, 186 N.W. 744 (1922); CoNFucrs REsTATEMENT 
§§502, 503 (1934). 
30 Judgment creditors of the estate have priority over general creditors. 2 WOERNER, 
AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §376 (1923). 
31 It is possible the local creditors may be prejudiced if they relied on being satisfied 
out of local assets and did not file claims elsewhere until after they discovered the foreign 
judgments would consume the entire local estate. By that time the statute of limitations 
may have expired in other jurisdictions. 
82 Note 5 supra. 
83 Note 4 supra. 
84 GOODRICH, CoNFLicr OF LAws, 3d ed., 571 (1949); 3 BEALE, CoNFLicr OF LAws 
1550 (1935). 
35 Note 6 supra. 
36 In Owsley v. Central Trust Co. of N.Y., (S.D. N.Y. 1912) 196 F. 412, the court 
justified the distinction on the theory that the executor takes title to all of the testator's 
personalty wherever situated so that voluntary payments made by nonresident debtors are 
good acquittance and an assignment by him enables the assignee to sue anywhere. How-
ever, these rights usually vest in the domiciliary representative whether executor or 
administrator. See GOODRICH, CONFLicr OF LAws, 3d ed., §§187, 188 (1949). 
371 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §172 (1923). 
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same jurisdiction are in privity with each other, executors qualify-
ing in other jurisdictions must also be in privity. This conclusion 
does not necessarily follow if one adopts the traditional view of 
privity.38 
In the leading case on same-party executors, Carpenter v. 
Strange,3° the Supreme Court did not attempt to distinguish execu-
tors from administrators, but stated simply that the prior judgment 
was conclusive because it was rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction upon the same subject matter, between the same par-
ties, 40 for the same purpose. The question of fraud was not even 
raised since the fraud problem is not applicable in this situation.41 
It is submitted that the straightforward approach of the court in 
the Carpenter case was appropriate to the case and that the same 
results should be reached in same-party administrator litigation. 
Thus if the judgment obtained in the foreign jurisdiction is de-
fended on the merits by the same party who is administrator in 
the second suit, the judgment should be given full faith and credit. 
Because the possibility of fraud or collusion still prevails, however, 
if the judgment is rendered against a different administrator, there 
should be no res judicata. 
II. Application of the Law to Other Situations 
Often a broad rule of law, though properly suited to the specific 
situation under which it developed, may not be applicable to other 
similar situations where it would seem to be applicable. The pur-
pose of the second half of this comment is to test the rules discussed 
in part I as they apply to three other situations, and to determine 
if the application of res judicata would be justified. It should be 
kept in mind that the policy of res judicata is to end needless liti-
gation by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on a ques-
tion of fact from retrying that question.42 Furthermore, it should 
be remembered that the administrators do possess a close identity 
of interest43 in that they are all representing the same decedent's 
estate.44 
88 See note 17 supra and adjacent text. 
89 141 U.S. 87 (1891). 
40 It seems the court ignored the different representative capacities of the executor 
and realistically recognized the identity of the interest represented. But see note 19 supra 
and adjacent text. 
41 It would be a highly unusual case where an administrator who had practiced 
collusive fraud in the first suit would raise his fraud in the second action. 
42 Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 283 U.S. 522 (1931). 
43 See Lomas v. Hilliard, 60 N.H. 148 (1880). 
44 For the remainder of the comment no distinction between administrators and 
executors will be drawn. 
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A. Judgment for the Estate in Credito't's Suit Against the 
Foreign Administrator. Where a creditor has fully litigated his 
claim in state A and loses, both the Restatement45 and one Supreme 
Court case46 hold that a second suit in state B is not barred. How-
ever, the other few cases directly on point have barred a second 
suit. In Lomas v. H illiard,41 after a full hearing on the merits of 
the creditor's claim and a disallowance by the Vermont probate 
court, a second suit was not permitted in New Hampshire. The 
court stated that where the same party is administrator in both 
states, 
" ... he exercises his own judgment in both states in behalf 
of the same estate and to say that an adjudication of a matter 
concerning the estate in one state, to which he was a proper 
party, would not be binding on the parties in another state, 
because he happened to derive his representative character 
in both states from different sources, is, it seems to us, a tech-
nical refinement not often found in modern legal reasoning. 
It is not suggested that the assets of the estate would be any 
differently affected in one jurisdiction than in the other, 
although the proceedings in each state are had primarily with 
reference to the assets in that state; nor is it apparent how the 
same administrator could do any more or less in his defense 
against the claim in this suit in one state than in the other."48 
Although admittedly the court ·was influenced by the fact that the 
same party was administrator in both states, the basic logic of this 
holding applies equally well to different party administrators when 
asserting bar.49 Of course, there is :i:io mutuality here, for if the 
creditor had won there would be no res judicata effect. But mutual-
ity is essentially an equitable doctrine requiring fairness and is not 
truly applicable here. The primary reason that the creditor does 
not have the benefit of res judicata is to prevent fraud, but the 
possibility of enforcing a fraudulently obtained judgment against 
the estate is not present when the estate wins the first suit. One 
might analogize this to defensive collateral estoppel where the 
45 CONFLICTS REs'I'ATEMENT §511 (1934). 
. 46 In Aspden v. Nixon, 4 How. (45 U.S.) 466 (1846), it was a contesting heir rather 
than a creditor who after losing in England was allowed to sue again in the United 
States. Thus no question of full faith and credit was involved. 
47 60 N.H. 148 (1880). 
48 Id. at 150. 
49 Goodall v. Marshall, 14 N.H. 161 (1843). Cf. Sanborn v. Perry, 86 Wis. 361, 56 
N.W. 337 (1893), where there was no trial on the merits, but the statute of limitations 
defeated the first suit. 
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usual need for mutuality is often disregarded.50 A recent analo-
gous case of defensive collateral estoppel is Riordan v. Ferguson.51 
In a prior action between the mortgagee and a grantee of several 
parcels of land from the mortgagor's larger tract, it was determined 
that the mortgage debt had been satisfied. Res judicata as a defense 
was successfully pleaded in a later foreclosure action by the mortga-
gee against another grantee of other parcels from the same mortga-
gor's tract. Though the grantees were not in privity with each 
other, they derived their interests from the same source as to pos-
sible defenses, and since a full adjudication was had on the merits, 
a second action was not allowed. 
The limited authority on point indicates that res judicata is 
presently being applied by some courts when a creditor upon losing 
the first suit attempts to sue another administrator in another 
jurisdiction. However, it may be noted that this result is limited 
to cases where the issue was litigated on the merits, and is not 
reached where, for example, the claim was disallowed because the 
statute o~ limitations had run in the first jurisdiction.52 
B. Judgment for Foreign Administrator in His Suit Against 
Debtor. It is a generally accepted rule that once an administrator 
has procured a judgment against a debtor of the decedent, the 
cause of action is merged and no other administrator can sue, either 
on the debt or on the judgment.53 Here the merger aspect of 
res judicata is utilized, but other administrators can not sue on the 
judgment. As usual, the reason given is that there is no privity. 
It could be argued that there is privity at least until a judgment 
is granted. A cause of action is a property interest, and, since each 
administrator mutually succeeds to the same transitory causes of 
action, they are mutually interested in the same property right. 
But it is said that once the judgment is rendered, the cause of action 
is appropriated to that jurisdiction,54 so that the other administra-
tors no longer have an interest. The merits of this last contention 
need not be seriously attacked, for there seems to be no pressing 
reason for permitting other administrators to sue on the judgment. 
50 Developments in the Law of Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818 at 862 (1952). 
51 (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 973. 
52Wilson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., (8th Cir. 1908) 164 F. 817; 19 L.R.A. (n.s.) 553 
(1909). See note, 41 IowA L. REv. 271 (1956). Contra, Sanborn v. Perry, 86 Wis. 361, 56 
N.W. 337 (1893), and cases collected in 19 L.R.A. (n.s.) 553 (1909). 
53 Talmage v. Chapel, 16 Mass. 71 (1819); Hare v. O'Brien, 233 Pa. 330, 82 A. 475 
(1911); CONFLICIS REs1°ATEMENT §505 (1934). 
54 See Coram v. Ingersoll, (1st Cir. 1906) 148 F. 169, revd. on other grounds 211 U.S. 
335 (1908). 
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Efficient collection of the judgment is possible at present because 
the successful administrator can sue on the judgment in any state 
where jurisdiction over the defendant can be attained.55 Also, the 
debtor is not now subject to excessive attachments by several ad-
ministrators, as might be the case if the rule were modified. 
C. Judgment for Debtor in Foreign Administrator's Suit 
Against the Debtor. There is a scarcity of cases in which the 
question of res judicata has arisen where the administrator's suit 
in state A against a debtor was defeated and a second suit under-
taken in state B.56 In the one leading case, Ingersoll v. Coram,51 
the Supreme Court, in reversing the First Circuit,58 held that the 
ancillary administrator was not barred from a second suit after 
judgment had gone against the domiciliary administrator. The 
Court admitted that the privity rationale in Stacy v. Thrasher was 
artificial and that it led to inconvenient and burdensome results 
from repetitious litigation. Yet the court felt constrained to deny 
the debtor relief because there was no mutuality in the sense that 
the estate as a whole would not be bound if it had lost as defend-
ant in a creditor's suit in one state. It is submitted that this is an 
unwarranted extension of the normal mutuality rule. But even 
if one should accept the Court's mutuality extension, it should 
not be applied unless the same danger of fraud on the estate exists 
as when the suing creditor wins. It is unlikely that when an ad-
ministrator sues a debtor he will be practicing collusive fraud on 
the estate at the instance of the debtor. For unless a large amount 
is involved, the debtor will probably not wish to draw attention 
to his debt or take the risks that would accompany such a fraudu-
lent scheme. But if he should deliberately have a collusive ancil-
lary administrator appointed, the domiciliary administrator would 
know of large outstanding debts and would be likely to check 
55 See note 53 supra. 
56 See Aspden v. Nixon, 4 How. (45 U.S.) 466 (1846), where the administrator of a 
contesting heir claiming decedent's estate was not barred from a second suit in the United 
States after losing a similar contest in England. 
57 211 U.S. 335 (1908). 
68 Coram v. Ingersoll, (1st Cir. 1906) 148 F. 169, revd. on other grounds 211 U.S. 335 
(1908). The Court barred a second action on a mutuality theory that if a judgment is 
binding when a plaintiff administrator wins, it should be binding also when he loses. 
Usually mutuality means that taking the same suit and parties, both parties should be 
able to assert res judicata principles regardless if they win or lose. The Court in the 
Ingersoll case has changed the format of the suit and has the debtor as plaintiff. But if 
the usual mutuality rule should be applied, res judicata would be applicable since if the 
same plaintiff administrator had won, defendant could have pleaded merger to another 
administrator's suit. 
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personally into the matter and defeat any such scheme.59 Further-
more, as to non-collusive fraud by the debtor alone, it must be 
assumed that the supervisory court and the first administrator will 
do their utmost to uncover any fraudulent design. In addition, if 
bar could not be asserted, the result could create considerable 
burdens on interstate corporations. If a decedent possessed a claim 
against a multi-state corporation depending on a close fact ques-
tion, the various administrators could sue the corporation in every 
state in which it does business until the estate finally wins a favor-
able jury verdict or forces the debtor corporation to compromise 
to prevent further nuisance suits. With the presently crowded 
court dockets, there is no room for unnecessary nuisance suits or 
relitigation of the same issue by parties who derive their cause of 
action from the same source. A debtor of the estate who wins on 
the merits in the first action should certainly be able to assert bar 
to further litigation by other administrators on the same cause 
of action. 
Conclusion 
Though the concept of separate administrations of decedents' 
estates will be with us for some time, it may be possible to alleviate 
some of its duplication of effort and excessive litigation through 
extended application of the res judicata doctrine in appropriate 
cases. Two trends in the law today lend support to such a result. 
First, there is a more extensive use of res judicata generally in re-
cent years.60 Secondly, there are already several breakthroughs in 
the walls supporting separate administrations. Executors and ad-
ministrators under statutes in several states can sue61 and be sued62 
outside their state of appointment. In the administration of small 
estates it has been suggested that the domiciliary representative be 
a universal administrator and completely eliminate the ancillary 
representative. 63 In view of these recent trends, in appropriate 
cases it is quite possible that the courts may adopt the contention 
IS9 Since the domiciliary administrator is often one who will share in the estate, he 
will no doubt make every effort possible to recover outstanding debts. 
60 See Developments in the Law of Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818 at 861-865 
(1952). For illustrations of the increased use of res judicata on jurisdictional questions, 
see Rashid, "Full Faith and Credit Clause: Collateral Attack of Jurisdictional Issues,'' 36 
GEo. L.J. 154 (1948); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951). 
611 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §163 (1923); Bayse, "Dis-
pensing With Administration," 44 MICH. L. REv. 329 at 413 (1945). 
62 Scott, "Hess and Pawloski Carry On,'' 64 HARv. L. REv. 98 (1950). Contra, CON· 
FLICTS REsrATEMENT §512 (Supp. 1948). 
63 Bayse, "Dispensing With Administration," 44 MICH. L. REv. 329 at 408 et seq. (1945). 
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that it is time that res judicata be applied more generally in the 
administration of decedents' estates. However, in those situations 
where real possibilities of fraud still prevail, the courts will prob-
ably retain the existing law. 
Norman-A. Zilber, S.Ed. 
